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The  1980s  have  seen an  explosion of  theoretical and  deductive analyses  of 
how  firms  operate  in markets  and of the  functioning  of  t heir internal 
organizations .  These  approaches  are characterized by  a  f ocus  on  the 
interaction between market  and  firm structure  and  conduct with  a  strong 
emphasis  on  the  strategic conduct of  f irms  and  individua l s.  Inferences  about 
firm  and market performance are  the ultimate goal  of thes e  new  approaches. 
The burst of theoretical activity in the  1980s  is not  unprecedented. 
During  the  1930s,  for  example,  Robinson  and Chamberlin  developed the  theory  of 
monopolistic competition that was  used in the nex t  de cade,  along with other 
neoclassical price concepts,  to  develop  a  wide  array of oligopoly price-
output equilibrium models.  From  1950  to  1980,  however,  advances  i n  the  theory 
of industrial organization,  such as  Bain's  theory of entr y  and  Porter' s  theory 
of strategic groups,  came  primarily from  empirically oriented practit i oners 
rather  than theorists .  The  time  is now  ripe  for  a  joini ng  of  t hese  two 
strains  through rigorous  empirical  testing of the  new,  and as  yet largely 
untested,  theoretical  approaches 'of the  1980s . 
Here  we  discuss  two  leading theoretical approache s  t o  understanding 
market  operation and performance.lI  These  approaches  share  a  common  empha-
sis on strategic behavior in the  contex t  of particular  markets,  firm 
!I  Other  new  work  in industrial organization includes  search  theory 
(Stiglitz 1979),  transaction cost theory  as  it appli es  t o  vertical rela-
tionships  (Williamson 1975,  1986a),  contestable market  t heory  (Baumol 
et al.  1982),  and  renewed work  on  oligopol y  conduct  and  equilibrium under 
uncertainty  (Breshnahan 1981,  Selten 1986).  Williamson' s  initial work was 
done  prior to  the  1980s;  however,  considerably more  has  been done  since.  The 
adoption in the  1982  Department  of Just ice  Merger  Guidelines  of a  Williamson 
type  of approach  to  vertical mergers has  i ncreas ed  interest in this work 
(Williamson 1986b). 
1 organizations,  and  information environments.  They  differ markedly,  however, 
in terms  of the  major  economic  questions  to which  they have  been applied.  The 
first,  the  game  theoretical approach,  has  been developed mainly  in the context 
of  firm  level decision making.  It is  a  microanalytic  approach  to  the analysis 
of  firm  conduct vis-a-vis its competitors  and market equilibria.  Agency 
theory,  on  the  other hand,  has  been mainly developed  to explain individual  and 
internal firm  decision making processes.  Its major  concern is with 
institutional questions  regarding what,  besides potentially ineffective 
competition with other  firms  in input and output markets,  disciplines  firm 
management.  Thus  it focuses  on  a  particular class of transaction costs--those 
arising from  corporate  organizational  forms  that feature  a  separation between 
ownership  and operational control.  It is also  concerned with how  existing 
forms  of discipline affect the  evolution of market  structure,  firm  governance 
systems,  and  firm financial  structure  (Fama  1980,  Jensen 1986).  Agency  theory 
is  a  modern attempt  to  address  the  issues of internal organization and 
corporate  control raised by  Berle  and Means  in their 1932  classic The  Modern 
Corporation and  Private Property. 
We  proceed by  giving a  brief description of  game  and  agency  theory 
approaches  to  industrial organization.  In the  final  section,  we  discuss 
empirical applications of these  approaches  to  the  measurement  of  industry 
performance. 
Game  Theory Approaches 
Rather  than generating novel  explanations  of how  markets  operate,  game 
theory and related approaches  offer  a  useful  framework  for  organizing thinking 
about  those  factors  that are believed to be  important  to  firm  competition.  By 
focusing  on  firm strategic behavior vis-a-vis its rivals,  this  approach  serves 
2 to  clarify which variables are critical to  strategic choice  and,  in turn,  to 
market operation.  As  Fudenberg  and Tirole note  'it imposes  some  discipline on 
theoretical thinking.  It forces  economists  to clearly specify the strategic 
variables,  their timing,  and  the  information structure faced  by  firms  (1987: 
176).'  In doing so,  game  theory has  lead to  revitalized research  on 
perennial  issues  such as  predation,  price discrimination,  and cartel behavior 
(see Roberts  1987). 
The  basic approach used is  to  model  interfirm rivalry as  a  one period 
game  or  a  multi-period supergame  in which  the  firms  involved choose  one  of  a 
set of possible strategies  to use  for  each period played.  The  strategies are 
associated with  a  payoff or profit matrix that depends  on  the  strategies 
chosen by  the  other  firms.  Interest centers  on how  firms  make  their strategic 
choices  and how,  over  time,  these  choices affect the  structure and performance 
of the market. 
Although relatively simple  in concept,  game  theory is not  simple  in 
application to  real markets.  The  model  must  specify who  the players  are,  what 
their relevant ranges  of strategic choices  are,  the  order  in which players 
make  their moves,  the  amount  of information  they have  on  their  own  and  other 
players'  positions  and strategic choices,  the  degree  of cooperation  among 
players,  and whether  the players  are  able  to  learn from  the  game  and  adjust 
their subsequent behavior.  In a  real market,  the  number  of possible 
combinations  quickly becomes  unmanageable.  Theoretical applications have, 
therefore,  concentrated on  identifying the critical variables  that explain how 
the  game  and,  by extension,  the market  functions. 
Two  recent works  are  illustrative of this  approach.  Encaoua et al. 
(1986),  for  example,  have  modeled  a  market  game  between  an  incumbent  firm  and 
3 a  potential entrant.  They  specify a  case where  the  existing firm  may  use  a 
competitive weapon  such as  price,  location,  or capacity to  discourage  entry 
into  the market.  The  game  is specified as having  two  periods ,  pre-entry and 
post-entry.  They  then discuss  a  variety of possible  forms  the  game  might  take 
depending  on whether  the  firms  cooperate  and  the quality of information held 
by  the  incumbent  and  the potential entrant.  On  the  latter point,  for  example, 
the potential entrant mayor  may  not be  able  to distinguish whether  the 
incumbent  firm's  strategic signals  on price are  real or bluffs . 
As  a  second example,  Salop  (1986)  employs  a  game  theory  approach  to  model 
practices  that credibly facilitate oligopoly coordination.  Using  a  two  firm 
model,  he  explores  the effect of various  types  of buyer-seller contracts  on 
the ability of an oligopoly to maintain a  collusive agreement  over  time.  In 
this work,  the strategic variable  focused  on is  the  form  of the buyer-seller 
terms  offered by  the  firms.  While  not reflecting the full richness  of 
reality,  there  is no  doubt  that such models,  by  focusing  on key  strategic 
variables,  are very useful  in analyzing many  types  of conduct  that have  been 
the  subject of antitrust cases.  Related work,  not all of which  is cast in an 
explicitly game  theoretic  framework,  includes Gilbert  (1986)  on preemptive 
competition,  Krattenmaker  and  Salop  (1986)  and  Mathewson  and Winter  (1986)  on 
vertical restraints,  and Katz  (1987)  on price discrimination in intermediate 
goods  markets. 
Two  key  characteristics on which  games  are classified are whether  they 
are non-cooperative  or  cooperative  and whether  information is  symmetric  or 
asymmetric.  Under  American antitrust laws,  most  oligopoly situations are non-
cooperative  games  in that it is not possible  for  the  players  to  make  binding 
agreements  among  themselves  (see Waterson  1984:  Ch.  3) .  Vertical 
4 relationships  may  feature  a  range  of cooperativeness  from  none  to very close 
(e.g.,  the  case of franchises).  Yet,  since  even close,  legally binding 
relationships  can be broken and are subject  to varying interpretation,  the 
non-cooperative  game  branch of  the  theory is most  widely useful  in industrial 
organization analysis. 
Similarly,  although  the  symmetric  information case  can be  interesting 
analytically,  the  asymmetric  situation is  the  one  widely  encountered in 
markets.  Milgrom  and  Roberts  (1987)  describe  the  two  polar  information cases 
with an apt analogy  to  simple  card games.  In the  symmetric  information case, 
all players  are dealt five  cards  face  up,  make  any bets  they wish,  and  then 
the best hand wins.  In the  asymmetric  information case,  the players'  cards 
are all dealt face  down.  Yet,  even here  the players  share  a  common  knowledge 
of the  number  and distribution of cards  so  that information is not  totally 
asymmetric.  The  most  interesting case  for  economic  analysis  is an 
intermediate  one  where  some  cards  are dealt up,  some  down,  and  each player may 
look at his  or her  own hole  cards.  Likewise  most  firms  have  access  to  a  body 
of common  industry knowledge but also possess  some  proprietary information 
that is not generally known.  Thus  the  theoretical work  on non-cooperative, 
asymmetric  information  games  is  the  most  promising avenue  for  identifying 
important strategic variables  and  new  hypotheses  for  empirical work. 
Theoreticians have  also  devoted considerable attention in their models  to 
the stability of games  or,  in other words,  to whether  the  games  generate  an 
equilibrium in the  market.  This  strain of the  work  is likely to  be  of less 
interest to  empirically oriented economists  seeking  to explain the  operation 
of  dynamic  markets.  Yet it may  offer significant insights  into  the  remarkable 
observed stability over  time  of many  oligopoly markets  in the United States. 
5 In addition,  game  theory models  also provide potentially potent tools  for 
analyzing  the  agency problems  that are  the  focus  of the  theoretical  approach 
discussed in the next section.  We  now  turn to  this  second approach. 
Agency  Theory Approaches 
Agency  theory is  an  important new  theoretical approach  to understanding 
market  and  firm organization.  It uses  transaction cost analysis  to provide  a 
general  theory that encompasses  several heretofore separate  theories  on  the 
relationship between ownership  in and control of large  industrial 
corporations.  These  theories  include  institutional analyses  by Veblen,  Berle 
and Means,  and Galbraith;  theories  of corporate  finance  by  Fama  and Jensen; 
and  theories of mergers  constructed by Manne,  Fama,  and Jensen. 
When  one  stops  to  think,  it is puzzling that microeconomic  theory 
continues  to  conceptualize the  firm  as  a  production function rather  than  a 
complex  organization with agency problems.1J  Berle  and Means  in The  Modern 
Corporation  and Private Property  (1932)  were  the first to point out  a  glitch 
in the  theory of the  firm when  they  documented  that ownership  can be,  and 
often is,  separate  from  control  in larger corporations,  thus  removing  the 
discipline  imposed by  the profit seeking owner/operator.  They  argued that 
corporate  democracy  often does  not work,  that stockholders have  very limited 
power,  that corporate managers  have  significant discretion with which  to 
pursue  their own  goals,  and that their conduct mayor  may  not be  compatible 
with  stockholders'  interests.  Galbraith extolled the virtues  of this 
separation and  the  ascendance  of technocratic managers  over market  forces 
(see,  for  example,  Galbraith 1971).  Berle  (1959)  even wrote  an eloquent book 
11  See  Cotterill 1987,  Rogers  and  Caswell  1988,  and  Caves  1980  for 
further  discussion of this point. 
6 Power  Without Property,  in which he  argues  that the universities  and 
intellectual elite should be  and  are  a  check  on  the unfettered power  of the 
business elite. 
Throughout  this era,  the neoclassical  theory of the  firm was  defended by 
many  economists  who  argued,  with Friedman  (1953) ,  that  it is useful  as  long 
as  large  firms  behave  "as  if"  they are profit maximizing entrepreneurs. 
Understandably,  many  economists  were  not comfortable  with either a  theory of 
the  firm that relied upon  the noblesse  oblige  of  a  business  or  academic  elite 
for  resource allocation or with  Friedman's black box  approach.  Industrial 
organization economists  did considerable research  on managerial discretion 
and  the  question of profit maximizing behavior in large corporations  during 
the  1960s  (Larner  1970,  Marris  1963,  Kamerschen 1968).  Rather  than being 
conclusively solved,  the corporate control riddle  simply receded. 
The  issue has  been reopened by  the work of Williamson  (1981)  on  trans-
action costs  and  the  internal organization of firms  and by  the  development  of 
agency  theory during  the  1980s  (Farna  1980,  Jensen 1983,  Farna  and Jensen 1983a, 
1983b).  Agency  theory directly addresses  the principal-agent problem  that 
occurs  when  any  person  (principal)  delegates  authority to  another person 
(agent)  to  perform desired activities.  Because it is  impossible  to  specify  a 
complete  contract,  agents  can  engage  in opportunistic behavior  such as 
managerial  shirking,  self-dealing,  and sub-optimization (Cotterill 1987). 
Agency  theory seeks  to  identify the  institutional structures,  i .e.,  the  market 
and internal firm  governance  structures,  that minimize  agency  costs  for  the 
principals of the  firm.  In other words,  it seeks  to  identify the disciplining 
factors,  other  than competition in input and  output markets,  that insure  that 
firm  management  acts  in the  interests of firm  owners. 
7 Three  potential  disciplining factors  are  identified by  agency  theory: 
the board of directors,  the executive  labor market,  and  the  market  for 
corporate  control.  The  board of directors  is  the first line of defense  for 
protection of the  interests of the  firm's  owners  or residual claimants  (Fama 
and Jensen 1983a:  312-15).  If it is not effective,  outside  sources  of 
discipline exist.  The  first of these  is the  operation of the  executive  labor 
market. 
Fama's  managerial  labor market  theory of social control  is  a  provocative 
application of agency  theory.  He  argues  that  the  separation of security 
ownership  and control is consistent with,  and  indeed is  a  fundamental  feature 
of,  modern corporate  finance  theories based upon portfolio diversification. 
It is also consistent with general equilibrium models  of securities markets 
such  as  the  capital asset pricing and arbitrage pricing models .  Separation 
presents  no  discipline problems  because  management has  an  indirect but no  less 
compelling  interest than  that  of the  stockholders  in firm performance.  In 
Fama's  words: 
The  managers  of a  firm rent  a  substantial  lump  of wealth--their human 
capital--to  the  firm ,  and  the  rental rates  for  their human capital. 
signaled by  the  managerial  labor market  are likely to  depend  on  the 
success  or failure of  the  firm  (Fama  1980:  291). 
The  manager  is disciplined by  the  fact  that salaries,  via the  executive  labor 
market,  reflect how well  individual  firms  are managed.  Since  firm performance 
is  determined,  at least in part,  by  the  performance  of the entire management 
team,  managers  have  a  stake  in the  performance  of those  above  and below  them 
in the  firm hierarchy.  They will actively engage  in two-way  monitoring  to 
discipline managerial performance,  eliminate opportunistic behavior,  and 
minimize  agency  costs. 
8 The  primary criticism of Fama's  theory is its implicit assumption that 
the monetary  reward structure produced by  the managerial  labor market  is 
congruent with  the  interests of stockholders.  In other words,  it requires 
that the  executive  labor market  work perfectly (i.e.,  experience  no  agency 
costs)  in order  for  the  agency costs associated with  the  separation of 
ownership  and control  to be minimized.  This  in turn requires perfect symmetry 
with respect to  information pertaining to  managerial performance  (Hirschey 
1986:  318).  Thus  the venue  of  the perfect market is shifted but the 
requirement of perfection remains  in order for problems  of corporate 
discipline to  disappear.  Nonetheless,  this  agency  theory approach  does 
suggest that firm  and  top  management  performance  may  depend  on  the  structure 
of executive compensation packages  and  how  they relate to  other compensation 
packages  available  in the market.  Herman  and Lowenstein provide  a  serviceable 
introduction to  and list of recent research on this  topic  (1986:  9-12). 
Managerial  labor markets  notwithstanding,  agency  theory's major  mechanism 
for  disciplining management  rests  in the market for  corporate  control. 
Building upon Manne's  1965  insight,  recent  theorists  reason that agency  costs 
are  minimized by  the  threat of hostile  takeover  and  the  completion of 
leveraged buyouts  (Fama  and Jensen 1983a,  1983b;  Jensen 1986).  The  threat of 
hostile takeover acts  as  an external disciplining mechanism  that forces 
slothful and opportunistic managers  to  shape  up  and maximize  the  transfer of 
wealth to  stockholders  or be  replaced. 
As  possible explanation for  leveraged buyouts  and other related corporate 
restructuring moves,  Jensen  (1986)  argues  that  a  major  problem  in corporate 
finance  and control  is how  to motivate managers  to payout cash  rather  than 
investing it internally at rates of return below  the  cost of capital or 
9 wasting it on organizational  inefficiencies.  Managers  can payout cash by 
increasing dividends  or buying back stock but both strategies  leave managers 
with control over  future  discretionary cash  flows.  Increasing the  leverage of 
the  corporation,  as  occurs  in a  leveraged buyout  (LBO),  commits  future  cash 
flows  to  cover  debt payments  and  thus  controls  the  agency  costs of free  cash 
flow.  Jensen also  argues  that issuing large  amounts  of debt  to buy back stock 
has  the  same  advantages. 
Agency  theory has value  as  an approach  to understanding  firms  and markets 
because  of its attempt  to  explore  issues  of internal management  and corporate 
control.  What  is  troubling about it is its blithe reliance  on  the  existence 
of competitive markets  and market  forces,  albeit one  step  removed  from  input 
and  output markets,  to  ensure profit maximization  in large organizations. 
These  forces  are  thought  to  guide  the  organization of corporate hierarchies, 
the  structuring of ownership  and control  relationships between stockholders 
and managers,  and  the  financial  and product structuring of corporations. 
Applications  to Measuring  Industry Performance 
Game  and  agency  theories  generate  a  wealth of performance hypotheses  for 
empirical  testing.  Rather  than enumerating  a  list of such hypotheses,  we  here 
discuss  a  major  performance  question facing  industry on which both approaches 
may  fruitfully be brought to bear.  This  is  the  issue  of the motivations  for 
and likely performance  implications  of the  unprecedented number  and size of 
mergers,  acquisitions,  leveraged buyouts,  and  other corporate  restructurings 
taking place  in the  food  and  related industries . 
The  central performance  and policy  issue raised by  these  events  is 
whether  they are principally motivated by  attempts  to  increase efficiency or 
market power,  since  their ultimate  performance  impacts  will rest on  the 
10 balance between  these  two  effects.  The  i ssue  of efficiency versus  market 
power  has been  (see,  for  example,  Demset z  1974)  and  remains  a  key  controversy 
in industry and  firm performance  research.  A  fine  review by  Thomas  (1986) 
concludes  that both  the Harvard  (market  power)  and  Chicago  (efficiency) 
paradigms  'fail to  effectively analyze  the central  issue of strategic 
planning  - the  sources of the  industrial heterogeneity that constitute 
competitive  advantage  (p.  25)'.  Corporate  restructuring,  as  a  major  source  of 
heterogeneity,  is  a  prime  area for  testing and expanding  the  two  paradigms . 
The  new  theoretical approaches  discussed here,  at least at their present 
level of development,  tend  toward opposing  assessments  of efficiency versus 
market  power motivations.  Game  theory with its emphasis  on strategic position 
and preemptive actions would  suggest market  power  or self protection 
motivations  for  corporate restructuring.  Agency  theory with its emphasis  on 
market  mechanisms  that reduce  agency costs would  suggest  an efficiency 
motivation behind the  same  restructuring.  The  empirically oriented economist 
has  an  important role  to play in this controversy. 
In the  area of takeovers,  some  empirical assessment  of the market  for 
corporate control  theory has  already been completed.  Herman  and Lowenstein 
(1986),  for  example,  analyzed the pre-acquisition profitability of target 
firms  and  the before  and after,  long run  (five year)  accounting profitability 
of acquiring firms.  Unlike  the  less reliable event studies of short run  (30-
60  day)  stock price  changes before  and after merger  announcement  (see,  e.g" 
Jensen and Ruback  1983;  for  a  review  see  Geithman 1987),  they  find little 
evidence  to  support  the  theory  that poorly managed  firms  were  acquired during 
the early 1980s,  although  takeovers  in the latter half of the  1970s  did 
conform  to  the  theory.  They  conclude  that at the beginning of  the  current 
11 merger  wave  there were  bargains  available but later acquirers  paid full price 
for  target firms  (see  also,  Ravenscraft  and Scherer  1987). 
Further work  on  the performance  impacts  of both friendly and hostile 
takeovers  is needed.  We  believe that examination of corollaries of agency 
theory will also yield useful indirect evidence  on  firm performance.  The 
theory predicts,  for  example,  that corporations with weak boards  of directors, 
no  dominant  shareholder interests,  and  a  low proportion of stock held by 
institutional investors will have higher  agency costs  and  thus be more 
susceptible  to  takeover by  firms  with strong boards  of directors.  If the 
market  for  executive  labor works,  the  managers  of these  firms  should also be 
relatively low paid because  their firms  are poorly managed.  All  these  are 
testable hypotheses. 
Two  examples  of major  corporate restructurings  that occurred  in the 
1980s  in the  food  industries illustrate the  complexity of the  corporate 
activities whose  performance  implications  must be  begun  to be understood.  The 
first is  the  purchase  of Heublein by R.J.  Reynolds  in 1982  for  approximately 
$1 .4  billion.  Reynolds  subsequently  combined  the  food  lines of Heublein  into 
its Del  Monte  division,  acquired Nabisco  Brands  in 1985  for  $4.9 billion, 
merged  Del  Monte  into Nabisco  Brands,  and sold the  remaining wine  and 
alcoholic beverages businesses  of Heublein  for  $1.2 billion in 1987.  Other 
business  lines were  also  sold after the  Nabisco  merger  resulting in the 
current corporate structure of RJR-Nabisco.  The  second illustrative 
corporate restructuring is  the  attempted  takeover  of Safeway  Stores  by  Dart 
Group  in 1986  and  the  leveraged buyout  that Safeway undertook in response. 
This  restructuring required a  massive  increase  in debt.  Before  Safeway went 
private in 1985,  its total assets were  $4.84 billion,  $1.3 billion or  27 
12 percent of which  was  long  term  debt.  The  leveraged buyout  added another  $4.63 
billion in debt requiring sale of several major  divisions  to  lower  the  debt 
load. 
On  the  surface,  it is difficult to  imagine  restructurings of this 
magnitude being explained by agency  theories positing efficiency motivations 
of reducing  agency  costs.  Yet  there  is  no  doubt  that corporate reorganization 
reflects  to  some  degree  a  reassessment of prevailing management  strategies at 
both the  corporate  and line of business  levels.  The  major  performance 
question remains  whether  this  reassessment  is motivated by efficiency 
opportunities  or market  power  opportunities arising from  the  current lax 
antitrust enforcement  atmosphere.  In the  Safeway,  Beatrice,  and other 
leveraged buyout cases,  as well  as  in many  acquisitions,  the market value of 
companies  has  often increased by billions of dollars  overnight.  These 
increases  dwarf  the  assessments  of the  costs of monopoly  power  and  X-
inefficiency made  in the  1970s  for  the entire food retailing and manufacturing 
industries  (Marion et al.  1979,  Parker  and  Connor  1979).  These  estimates  were 
criticized as being  too high but the  deregulated capital markets  of the  1980s , 
if agency  theory  is correct,  appear  to be  identifying inefficiencies of much 
greater magnitude. 
Alternatively,  the  emphasis  of  game  theory on  the  importance  of strategic 
position and market  power  may  prove  to  be  a  more  powerful  tool  than agency 
theory for understanding structural change within firms  and  industries  and its 
performance  implications.  In either case,  these  new  theories  provide 
economists  with new  approaches  to  and  impetus  for performance  research. 
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